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callousness... The other main idea, obviously
connected with the first, is that, once the gravest
forms of political injustice are eliminated by
following just (or at least decent) basic institutions,
these great evils will eventually disappear. (LP p. 7)
III. Peoples and People
Let us examine § 11. The contrast Rawls
makes in this section is between his "liberal
social contract political conception of justice"
and a cosmopolitan conception which starts
from individuals. Why not start with a global
original position? Ultimately one must ask what
would be the consequences of starting from one
point rather than the other. What difference in
principles would result? Consider hierarchy.
While, in se, the abolition of hierarchy is a good,
for Rawls, the matter comes down to the denial
inherent in such a stance of the acceptability of
any other than a liberal society; decent
hierarchical societies are ruled out [if not
declared oxymoronic], and hence an entire
segment of the world is declared morally
illegitimate. In Kantian terms, it is to deny the
dignity of all other types of societies than our
own.

IV. Conclusion
"Rawls' methodology is distinctive, striking
and in the end (when examined) unacceptable to
anyone with any knowledge of international
law." Perhaps lawyers ought not look to Rawls
for guidance; who told them to? I would argue
that he never wrote for lawyers. Rawls has
certainly never averred any claims that his ideas
are useful tools for either lawyers or politicians.
The Law of Peoples is the province of moral
philosophers and theorists of international ethics
and justice. The subject-matter is not law
strictly construed; unfortunately English cannot
render '"us" otherwise than "law", and as Rawls
states (LP p. 3, n. 1) his derivation is from jus
gentium in its pre-positivist form. Would any of
Professor Brilmayer's criticism have arisen if
Rawls had entitled the work "Justice among
Peoples"?
If one chooses to borrow from Rawls, it
should be obvious that it is not a toolbox which
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can offer anything except philosophical
justifications for moral and political principles,
an explanation of why they are reasonable and
desirable; it makes no other claims. Readers
will not find anything telling them how to act
upon and realize these principles; that is simply
a task which Rawls did not undertake. It is an
unreasonable petitio principii to fault him for not
having done so, but a much graver error to
impute to Rawls practical claim he has not made
and then find them lacking.
Harry D. Gould
The Johns Hopkins University

THE LAW OF PEOPLES
Modem international law began in the
seventeenth century as "the law of nature
applied to nations". Lawyers and philosophers
took principles already well-known and highlydeveloped in studying the natural rights and
obligations of persons and applied them to
relations between states. (See e.g., E. de Vattel,
Le droit des gens, ou principes de la loi
naturelle appliques 6 la conduite et aux affaires
des Nations et des Souverains (1758)). States
and persons are not the same, as clear-headed
practitioners such as Emmerich de Vattel readily
admitted, but the temptation to recycle good
philosophy as law was very strong, some
parallels between persons and states are
legitimate, and most lawyers have spent as much
time representing individuals (not states) as
philosophers have spent thinking about
individuals (and not states), so the habit
continues.
John Rawls presents a recent example of this
Having developed an
ancient phenomenon.
for constitutional
of
justice
elaborate theory
democracies (A Theory of Justice, Harvard,
1971), and refined it in his book on Political
Liberalism (New York, 1993), Rawls has now
applied his conclusions to international relations.
The subjects of Rawls' Law of Peoples are
members of what he calls the "Society of
Peoples", which is to say those states that meet
his test as "decent" societies. Rawls published
his Law of Peoples bound together with The
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Idea of Public Reason Revisited (on domestic
political discourse), to underline the intimate
connection between his "liberal" theories of
domestic and of foreign politics. Both depend
on a "Public Reason" that avoids questions of
truth to construct a "political zone", within
which government can take place (p. vi).
International Law
Rawls' "Law of Peoples" recycles his
domestic conception of right and justice to
reconstruct the principles and norms of
international law. Rawls proposes a "Society of
Peoples" to embrace all "decent" (p. 3) states
that follow the ideals and principles of his new
law of peoples in their international relations.
Rawls' concept of "decency" corresponds
loosely with the concept of "civilized" nations in
Article 38(c) of the statute of the International
Court of Justice. "Decent" states would seem to
be those states whose views are worth taking
into account in constructing the law of nations.
Rawls' study of international law offers a
new epistemology of international justice, to
complement his liberal technique for finding
justice within states. The concepts of "decency"
(between states) and "reasonableness" (within
states) define whose views will count, and in
which circumstances, when deliberating about
justice. But Rawls' concept of "decency", as
applied to states, is broader than his concept of
"reasonableness"
as applied to persons.
"Decent" states also include "decent hierarchical
peoples" (he means governments), whose public
officials "consult" their subjects, without giving
them any real voice or power (p. 4). Such
governments are not "reasonable" in their
internal politics, but still manage to be "decent"
in their external relations.
This curious gap between "decency" and
"reasonableness" reflects Rawls' recognition of
a difference between "ideal" and "non-ideal"
theory. In a perfect world, all states would be
"reasonable" liberal democratic societies, as
described in his book on PoliticalLiberalism.
Rawls developed his general "Law of Peoples"
to serve this ideal situation. But because not all
states really are liberal democracies, Rawls has
extended his liberal Law of Peoples as much as
ASIL *

nonnon-liberal
to
embrace
possible
democracies, to the extent that they are still
"decent" enough to participate in international
relations (p. 5).

Realism
Rawls sets out to construct what he calls a
"realistic" utopia, in which reasonably just
constitutional
democratic
societies
can
participate in a broader international society.
This international society must be "realistic", in
that it takes the world and human nature as it is
- imperfectly democratic. Rawls' proposal is
still "utopian" because he hopes to construct an
international social structure that will realize
political right and justice for "decent" peoples
(p. 6). Political injustice leads to other evils,
Rawls believes, so that establishing better basic
political institutions will put an end to unjust
war, religious persecution and other forms of
oppression on both the domestic and the
international levels (p. 7).
Realism means pushing the acceptable range
of basic social institutions as far as possible in
the direction of actual institutions as they
presently exist, without sacrificing the ultimate
ideal of liberal justice. At the beginning of his
Contrat Social, Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote of
taking men as they are, to construct laws as they
might be. Rawls takes states as he imagines
them to be, to construct international law as he
would wish it to be. He sets aside questions of
war, immigration and nuclear weapons on the
assumption: (1) that democracies and decent
authoritarian states will not fight each other; (2)
that immigration need not be permitted; and (3)
that nuclear weapons are only necessary to keep
outlaw states at bay (pp. 8-9).
Rawls' "realism" lies in his willingness to
extend the "original position", in which all states
determine the rules of justice between
themselves, to include non-liberal nondemocracies. In his earlier Theory of Justice
(1971) and Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls
proposed an "original position" for designing the
basic concept of justice in liberal constitutional
democracies.
This original position was

2223 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NW 9 WASHINGTON, DC

92000

46 * INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY
460

Volume 6(2)

Volume 6(2)

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY

designed to take the religious and philosophical
beliefs of all "reasonable" people equally into
account in constructing the basic rules of justice.
"Reasonable" in this context included only those
people whose philosophy or religion made them
willing to take other people's "reasonable"
views equally into account. Applied to states,
Rawls' "realism" in designing his new original
position means taking the interests and views of
all "decent" governments equally into account at
the international level, including the views of
some governments that have not adopted the
original position conception of justice to govern
their domestic affairs. Rawls gives the views
and desires of "decent" non-liberal nondemocracies the same weight as the views and
desires of reasonable democratic states (p. 10).
The Fact of Pluralism
This "realistic" theory of justice in both its
domestic and its international versions develops
from what John Rawls has called "the fact of
reasonable pluralism" (p.11). This "fact" as
Rawls imagines it in constructing his domestic
and international constitutional ideals assumes
the persistence of an inevitably permanent and
unavoidably
conflicting
plurality
of
"comprehensive" conceptions of the good,
which people and peoples will neither change
nor compromise in the face of reasoned
arguments or truth (p. 12). Rawls constructs his
theories of justice and international relations on
the basis of reciprocity between the holders of
these
mutually incompatible
and
noncommensurable "comprehensive" moral views
(p. 14).
This fundamental assumption of the "fact of
pluralism", as Rawls understands it, is simply
false as applied to normal political relations,
which vitiates his concept of "political
liberalism" in domestic politics. The "fact of
pluralism" may be better supported in
international relations, but not as the basis of any
"just" law of peoples. The "fact" of pluralism is
false as applied to normal political relations
because
very
few
individuals
have
"comprehensive" conceptions of the good. Most
people have partial conceptions of the good. To
the extent that people do hold comprehensive
ASL *

views, reasonable people (in the word's usual
sense), will be willing to modify their opinions
when faced with cogent arguments for changing
their minds. People who cling to non-revisable
irrational conceptions of the good, refusing to
engage in reasoned argument, are not
"reasonable", despite Rawls' appropriation of
that term. Their refusal to reason makes them
unreasonable, and discounts the moral relevance
of their views.
Rawls' concept of pluralism may apply
better to states, because states are inherently less
reasonable than individual persons engaged in
public deliberation. States are less reasonable
than individual persons because states are not
real persons, and cannot reason, except to the
extent that the particular
persons or
representative structures that govern states at
any given time reason on their behalf. To the
extent that states represent real persons
deliberating in good faith about justice and the
purposes of government, they may usefully be
considered as "reasonable". Non-representative,
non-democratic state structures represent
nobody, except their government's interest in
power, wealth and self-preservation.
Such
attitudes generate inevitable pluralism and
incommensurability of views between states, but
they are not "reasonable". Sometimes each
self-seeking government's relatively equal
power forces a modus vivendi in which each
government leaves the others free to exploit their
own subjects. This self-interested stand-off has
no rational connection with either law or justice.
Reason
Rawls' conception of "reason" means the
willingness to get along. "Reasonable" people,
as Rawls understands the term, are people who
do not challenge their neighbors' fundamental
beliefs.
No moral questions are open for
discussion, beyond the purely political (p. 16).
Extended to create a "reasonable" law of
peoples, this rationale determines that the
governments of states should not challenge the
fundamental commitments of the governments
of other states, until these cross some ultimate
threshold of "decency" (p. 17). Rawls' sense of
"reasonable" implies the necessity of never
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contradicting others. Rawls' sense of "rational"
means pure and undisguised self-interest (p. 18).
The idea of public reason for Rawls'
"Society of Peoples" parallels the idea of public
reason in his domestic democratic constitutional
model (p.19).
Rawls avoids confrontation
because he fears the fanaticism of religious
conviction (p. 21). The over-confidence of
irrational faith does often lead to persecution,
but not simply because "comprehensive" beliefs
are too deeply held. What makes such views
dangerous is their irrationality.
Defining
"reason"
to avoid reasoned discussion of
fundamental moral questions strengthens the
power of irrationality and therefore the threat of
violence. Rawls advocates the maintenance of
formal respect for and deference to irrationally
held comprehensive views, when he should have
prescribed humility in the application of
reasoned discourse to reduce the dangers of
religious and philosophical oppression.
"Reasonable" peoples, according to Rawls'
theory of reason, are peoples willing to offer
"fair" terms of cooperation to other peoples, just
as reasonable citizens in domestic society should
offer to cooperate with fellow citizens (p. 25).
This formula would be perfectly acceptable if
Rawls had a more robust conception of fairness.
Rawls' sense of "reasonable" is too far removed
from actual reason to offer any useful measure
of what should count as "fair" between peoples.
Assuming a plurality of equally "reasonable" yet
"comprehensive" doctrines traduces the normal
sense of both words, by assuming that persons,
behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which
views they will hold, would agree equally to
honor all views, and would not prefer to
encourage those moral views that are actually
more correct (p. 31).
Peoples
Rawls speaks of "peoples" rather than
"nations" or "states" to convey the need for
community among the inhabitants of a given
territory, whatever their origin may be (p. 25).
"State" implies sovereignty and a certain
separation between the government and people
that Rawls strongly disapproves (pp. 25-26). By
ASIL e

writing of "peoples" rather than "states" in the
second-level "original position" in which states
determine their mutual duties, Rawls implies
that states in a sense do (or should) speak for,
embody or represent the peoples that they rule.
This introduces a spurious impression of consent
into Rawls broader society of "decent" peoples,
which includes the governments of authoritarian
and non-democratic states, who have no
legitimate authority to deliberate or to consent
on behalf of their subjects.
By using the word "peoples" in writing of
governments, Rawls hopes to convey the
"reasonable" values of reciprocity that ought to
exist between states (p. 28).
Reciprocity
between peoples would be desirable, but should
not necessarily extend to the governments of all
states, whose interests may be quite different
from those of the peoples that they rule. By
obscuring the difference between peoples
(subjects) and states (governments), Rawls gives
states a spurious legitimacy, and too much
authority in speaking on behalf of the peoples
that they rule. Just as liberal governments view
their subjects as free and equal citizens
(according to Rawls' theory), so he believes that
international society should view all states as
free and equal in constructing international law
(p. 31). But many states are neither free nor
equal. Some are authoritarian non-democracies.
Such governments do not deserve an equal
voice.
Perhaps at this point one might argue that
even when the governments of states deserve no
equal voice, their peoples do, which is certainly
true. In constructing rules of international
justice
some
imaginary
pre-political
''representative" of the people may need to be
constructed to express their interests and views
(p. 33). Rawls would picture this representative
as also speaking for the state. The difference
between "states" and "peoples" is not for Rawls,
as it would be in ordinary discourse, the
difference between governments and subjects,
but rather the difference between two types of
government.
Governments that respect the
dignity of other governments are "peoples", in
Rawls' terminology, and governments of
"states" are those that do not (p. 35).
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Toleration

States
"State", as the word is usually understood,
signifies the government of a determinate
territory, with its own population ("people") and
political independence, confirmed through
recognition by the governments of other separate
(and "sovereign") states.
Rawls speaks of
"peoples", but he means states when he writes
that they should be: (1) free and independent; (2)
bound by treaties; (3) equal; (4) committed to
non-intervention; (5) pacifist, except in selfdefense; (6) respectful of human rights; (7)
humanitarian when forced into war; and (8)
committed to helping less fortunate states to
achieve prosperity and good government. These
are the basic tenets of the "Law of Peoples" that
Rawls imagines that the representatives of states
("peoples") would embrace in an original
position, behind the veil of ignorance (p. 37).
Rawls assumes stable boundaries between
states. However historically arbitrary a state's
geographical boundaries, Rawls would maintain
them in perpetuity to give each people a clear
sense of property and responsibility over its own
national territory and fate (pp. 38-39).
Governments would insist on equality (p. 57) in
the original position (Rawls believes) to protect
their own interests from being short-changed to
serve the happiness of others. This leads to the
familiar and largely traditional "Law of Peoples"
that Rawls adapts from long-established usage in
international law and practice (p. 46).
In the first instance, Rawls' "Law of
Peoples" applies only to liberal democratic
states, such as those constructed behind the "veil
of ignorance" in his first (domestic) "original
position".
His law of nations emerges
"politically", and not as an expression of the

comprehensive doctrines of truth or right that
might hold sway in any particular society (p.
55).
As extended to "decent hierarchical
peoples", Rawls' rationale must be somewhat
different. Principles that would be accepted
from the standpoint of liberal democratic
peoples acting behind a veil of ignorance must
be shown also to be valid from the standpoint of
authoritarian hierarchical states that reject the
principles of liberal democracy (p. 58).
ASIL.9
ASI1L

Rawls proposes to extend the benefits of the
Law of Peoples to non-liberal governments, by
By
applying the principle of "toleration".
"tolerate" (contrary to ordinary usage), Rawls
means not simply to put up with, but fully to
include non-liberal governments in his Society
of Peoples (p. 59). Rawls would "tolerate" (in
this broad sense) all "decent" peoples (p. 60),

including certain non-liberal governments,
because he believes that the dignity of their
subjects would be compromised by any
measures taken to encourage "decent"
authoritarian governments to become more
democratic and liberal. Here again Rawls
equates disrespect for governments with
disrespect for peoples (p. 61).

By confusing

peoples and states Rawls diminishes the power
of peoples against their own governments.
There may well be non-liberal states that deserve
the protection of Rawls' eight principles of
international law, but their governments should
be tolerated (in the ordinary sense of the word),
not praised. Contrary to what Rawls' believes,
states that disenfranchise their peoples should be
stigmatized as wrong, even when they must be
tolerated, for prudential reasons.
Toleration implies error, as Rawls well
understands. His broad conception of toleration
is tactical, like his domestic strategy of
reasonable pluralism. Rawls believes that if
liberal peoples pretend that authoritarian
governments are fully acceptable, and act as if
authoritarian leaders were fully respectable, then
eventually authoritarian states will move
towards liberalism.
This reflects Rawls'
fundamental beliefs (1) that all criticism is
counterproductive, and (2) that all moral change
comes from within. Rawls opposes challenging
false moral beliefs or bad government practices
directly, because he does not think that criticism
will persuade. Rawls would like governments to
reform themselves in their own way.
Recognizing authoritarian governments as part
of a decent society of peoples will encourage
them to reform (p. 61).

Rawls believes that

peoples will lapse into bitterness and resentment
when liberal governments criticize the
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authoritarian masters of non-democratic states

rights, the common good, and judicial sincerity

(p. 62).

(p. 67) may still deserve protection against

Rawls' conception of toleration as full
inclusion and respect weakens the persuasive
value of good institutions, by forcing good
governments to pretend that bad governments

are equally respectable. This deprives bad
governments of the truth, which might have
encouraged reform, and perverts international
discourse, to the extent that non-representative
governments have an equal voice in
international affairs. True toleration includes a
measure of disapproval.
Hiding this
disapproval, as Rawls suggests that we should,
will dispirit reformers within authoritarian
regimes, and betray the aspirations of their
peoples. Rawls' conception of toleration betrays
the oppressed by denying the reality of their
oppression. It encourages liberal peoples to
collude with foreign injustice.

aggression and other violations of international
law. Rawls' standards of decency are too broad,
because he insists on respecting all "decent"
states equally, as if they were fully liberal and
democratic, which they are not. No government
that denies the political equality of its citizens
will ever fully respect their human rights, or
seek their common good. Rawls' fantasy of
"consultation" through group leaders (p. 64) will
only entrench certain "leaders" in power, and
coerce citizen membership in artificially
perpetuated groups. (Cf. Mussolini's system of
consultation with the recognized leaders of
socially representative "fasces" in Italy.)
Denying the equal citizenship of any member of
society is not "decent", and future subjects of the
law would not accept authoritarian government
behind a veil of ignorance, as Rawls himself
must recognize.

Decency

Perhaps governments may properly be
considered to be "decent" when they try to serve

Rawls defends himself against this charge of
collusion by insisting that his Law of Peoples
extends its benefits only
to "decent"

the common good of their people (p. 67). But

authoritarian regimes (p. 61).

These regimes

count as "decent", because they have a "decent
consultation hierarchy" (p. 63), they do not
harbor aggressive aims (p. 64), they respect
human rights (p. 65), they view all members of

society as decent and rational, and their judges
and public officials sincerely believe that the law

serves the common good of all those subject to it
(pp. 66-67).
The main difference between
"decent" authoritarian regimes and liberal states
lies in their different conceptions of the subjects
of the law. Liberal governments respect their
subjects as free and equal citizens. "Decent"
authoritarian regimes regard their subjects as
members of groups (p. 66), and consult only
with officially recognized group "leaders" in
deciding public policy (p. 64).
Rawls' eight Laws of Peace apply only to

"decent" peoples, which makes his criteria of
decency both too narrow and too broad for the
different purposes they serve. Rawls' standards
of decency are too narrow, because governments
that do not meet his requirements of human
ASIL 9

governments are not fully worthy of respect
unless they also actually realize the common
good to some extent, and this will never happen
under authoritarian regimes. By putting the
rulers of authoritarian governments into his
inter-state "original position", alongside the
representatives of liberal democracies (p. 69),

Rawls pollutes his contractarian model.
Authoritarian governments cannot speak for
their subjects, because they do not represent
their subjects. Governments that claim equality
in the international arena should first concede
equality to their subjects at home. Rawls'
conception of a "decent consultation hierarchy"
(p. 71) cannot replace the direct representation

of citizens, because authoritarian systems
delegate authority without consulting the
citizens themselves (p. 72).

Self-appointed or

government-selected group "leaders" can only
represent their own interests, not those of other
citizens or groups (p. 73).
Human Rights

Rawls' two primary tests of "decency" are
respect for the common good, and protection of
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the most basic universal human rights. Defining
either too broadly would assimilate decency to
democracy and liberalism, which is not Rawls'
purpose. Instead, he restricts the human rights
requirements of "decency" to a short list of
"fundamental" rights (p. 78) against military
aggression, slavery, religious persecution, and
genocide (p. 79).
Rawls suggests that
governments respecting these minimum rights
should be immune from economic sanctions or
other interference designed to protect or to
encourage their subject peoples (p. 80). Outlaw
states that violate fundamental human rights
may be sanctioned or invaded (p. 81), but Rawls
would respect authoritarian non-democracies,
even though they deny the more refined human
rights of constitutional democracies.
Despite his Kantian antecedents (p. 87),
Rawls disavowed the immediate recognition of
any world-wide "cosmopolitan" justice, that
would respect the equal rights and liberties of all
persons, without discrimination (p. 82).
Respecting the universal and equal dignity of all
persons would threaten the power of "decent"
authoritarian governments, by undermining their
authority. Beyond the absolute minimum of a
"common
good"
attitude,
"reasonable"
consultation, good-faith judges (pp. 61, 67) and
minimum human rights, such as those against
slavery and genocide (p. 79), Rawls refused to
endorse
any
values
that authoritarian
governments could not themselves accept (p.
83). Even to offer incentives, in the form of
foreign aid, for governments to respect human
rights, would violate Rawls' policy of

"respecting" authoritarian governments (pp. 8485).

Rawls' deferential attitude towards existing
regimes seems unnecessary to his basic theory
and fundamentally unjust to the subjects of
authoritarian governments, whose rights Rawls
disregards.
His arguments has three parts,
describing (1) the law of peoples that would
prevail between liberal states, then (2) extending
the same rules to "decent" authoritarian

governments, and finally (3) protecting "decent"
non-liberal non-democracies against criticism.
The first step is .reasonable,
excessive,
and
the
third
ASIL *

the second
pernicious.

Volume 6(2)

Deliberative, democratic and rights-respecting
governments (1) should defer to each other in
ways that non-democratic or non-liberal
governments (2) do not deserve, and certainly
not (3) without criticism. By putting nonrepresentative governments into an equal
position "behind the veil of ignorance" (and in
the community of states) as just and
representative democracies (p. 86), Rawls
minimizes the protection of human rights in his
unnecessarily illiberal "law of peoples".
The Law of Peoples
The eight principles of Rawls' Law of
Peoples
(p.37),
regarding
states'
(1)
independence, (2) respect for treaties, (3)
equality, (4) non-intervention, (5) pacifism, (6)
respect for rights, (7) humanitarian attitude to
war, and (8) generosity, are all constrained by,
and to a large degree derived from, or
subordinated to, his fundamental commitment to
the sovereign power of "decent" governments,
against their own subjects. Rawls' proposals
mirror standard nineteenth-century international
law doctrine (1-3 and 7), slightly modified by
post-second-World-War pacifism (4-5) and the
Western charitable impulse (8). Rawls' weak
commitment to human rights deprives his
doctrine of the only transformative element (6)
that might have challenged existing authoritarian
structures and orthodoxies.
Universal human rights to personal security
and political participation have a stronger
position in contemporary international law than
they do in Rawls' Law of Peoples (see e.g.
M.N.S. Sellers, "Republican Principles in
International Law" 11 Connecticut Journal of
International Law 403 (1996)).
Had Rawls
understood the duty "to honor human rights" (p.
37) more robustly, his proposals might have
strengthened international law. As it is, Rawls'
"Law of Peoples" encourages oppression, by
protecting the independence and equality of
oppressive governments without restraint, short
of absolute chattel slavery, ethnic genocide or
other violations of what Rawls calls the most
"urgent" human rights (p.79). Only then would
Rawls permit liberal societies to begin to
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encourage certain "outlaw" governments to
reform (p. 93).

might usefully have entered into a second-tier
inter-state "original position" to construct
But putting noninternational institutions.

Rawls overlooks important distinctions
between the different situations in which just
societies may (1) criticize unjust governments,
(2) impose non-military sanctions on unjust
governments, or (3) take military action to
correct international injustice. His curiously
broad conception of toleration would seem to
imply that authoritarian governments may not be
(1) criticized or (2) sanctioned until they may
also (3) be corrected by military force. The
choice of means becomes entirely prudential.
Rawls presents governments as either "decent"
or "outlaw" states. Decent states must deliberate
among themselves to decide the best means of
correcting outlaws (p. 93). Throughout his
argument, the standards of intervention and
criticism of injustice under Rawis' "Law of
Peoples" become increasingly strict, until even
human sacrifice may be to some extent
protected, so long as outlaw states do not export
it (pp. 93-94, footnote 6).

representative non-democracies into the original

Conclusion
John Rawls' "Law of Peoples" goes wrong
by extending the title of "decency" too far
among illiberal non-democratic states.
By
giving illiberal non-democracies an equal voice
in determining international law, Rawls
replicates the worst elements of existing
international practice. Like the older conception
of "civilized" nations, which Rawls' theory
reproduces for the modem world, "decency" is
both too broad and too narrow as applied to
states under international law. Too broad,
because it gives unrepresentative governments
an equal voice in determining the law of nations.
Too narrow, because it deprives subject peoples
of any voice at all, when their governments
oppress them.
Rawls' concept of the "original position"
might have been useful in reforming
international law, if applied from the standpoint
of all human beings, to regulate state structures
and interstate relations. Or the governments of
just states, as constructed by their future subjects
from the standpoint of the original position,
ASL e

position, as Rawls suggests, would simply

perpetuate the interests of illiberal elites against
their unfortunate subjects. States are not people,
and unless governments actually speak for
peoples, Rawls' technique of imagining a non-

liberal

interstate

"original

position"

is

dangerously misplaced.
The fundamentals of a just law of peoples

hover somewhat obscured in the midst of Rawls'
overextended conception of "decency". The
"common good idea of justice" and "basic

human rights" (pp. 65, 71) deserve a more
prominent place at the center of any just law of
nations, which Rawls denies them by
minimizing rights, and overstating self-interest.

At times in his argument, Rawls seems to
contemplate a more robust world order (pp. 65,

80), only to retreat in the end (pp. 69, 82-83) to
the defense of authoritarian governments, and
excessive deference to established power (pp.
122-3, esp. note 1, in which Rawls seems to
sympathize with Jefferson Davis against the
"expansionist" North.)
Had he drawn his
conception of "decency" more narrowly, Rawls'
argument would have made more sense.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore

THE SIGNIFICANCE
PEOPLES

OF RAWiS'S LAW

OF

Rawls' recent book on "The Law of
Peoples," (henceforth LP) corrects many of the
weaknesses of his earlier essay by the same
name. For example, the book says more about
economic and social equality, and adds an eighth
fundamental principle that: "Peoples have a duty
to assist other peoples living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just or
decent political and social regime" (37). In
addition, Rawls devotes several pages (105-120)
to the discussion of burdened societies and
distributive justice among peoples.
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